










Scholars have suggested that counterfactual thinking may play an important role in entre-
preneurship; however, empirical research positioned to inform the nature of this relationship
has been equivocal. In this study, we draw on the tenets of social cognition theory as a basis
to investigate the relationship between counterfactual thinking and the dispositional
attributes of the entrepreneur, hypothesizing concomitant influences upon the entrepre-
neur’s self-efficacy. Based on a survey of 138 entrepreneurs, our findings suggest that the
implications of counterfactual thinking for entrepreneurial self-efficacy are moderated by
individual differences based in the dispositional attributes of the entrepreneur.
Introduction
“When one door closes, another opens; but we often look so long and so regretfully
upon the closed door that we do not see the one which has opened for us.”
—Alexander Graham Bell
Entrepreneurship has been conceptualized as a process of envisioning the future (Haynie,
Shepherd, & McMullen, 2009). Scholars have suggested that these conceptualizations of
future events, outcomes, and consequences are often based in counterfactual thoughts; that
is, reflections upon “what might have been” if the individual had acted differently, or if the
circumstances surrounding an event or action had been different (Baron, 2000; Gilovich
& Medvec, 1994; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1994; Miller & McFarland, 1986). Roese (1997)
highlights that “thoughts of what might have been, may suggest paths to what may yet be
(p. 133, emphasis added). Specifically, counterfactual thinking involves comparing actual
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events to “alternatives that are constructed ad hoc rather than retrieved from past experi-
ence” (Kahneman & Miller, 1986, p. 136). In the context of entrepreneurship—where a
future-focused orientation is pervasive and opportunity discovery the goal—the role that
counterfactual thinking may play in defining “what may yet be” could prove important.
However, support for this proposition remains ambiguous in the context of the extant
entrepreneurship research.
Implicit in some conceptualizations of the entrepreneurial process is an acknowledge-
ment of the role that individual difference attributes may play with regard to impacting
entrepreneurship-related outcomes (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shane & Venkatara-
man, 2000; Venkataraman, 1997). Recently, Baron (2008) and others have adopted a
social cognition lens to suggest that attributes of personality exert “strong effects on
cognition—the processes through which information is entered into memory, processed,
and retrieved for later use” (p. 328; see also Forgas, 1995; Isen, 2002). Further, cognitive
psychologists adopting a social cognition lens suggest that individual differences based on
such things as beliefs, attitudes, and also attributes of personality serve to bias both
cognitive processing, and subsequent behavioral outcomes (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). These
propositions generally suggest that entrepreneurship research should be situated in the
human experience, so as to effectively consider how and why both intra- and inter-
individual differences influence entrepreneurial outcomes and behaviors.
In this study, our aim is to adopt an individual-differences lens as an empirical step
toward clarifying the role that counterfactual thinking may play in entrepreneurship,
specifically with regard to entrepreneurial self-efficacy. Self-efficacy refers to the belief in
one’s capabilities to organize and execute the actions required to manage prospective
situations (Bandura, 1978), and has been demonstrated to be an important antecedent to
entrepreneurial action (Bandura; Zhao, Seibert, & Hills, 2005). We investigate the rela-
tionship between counterfactual thinking and entrepreneurial self-efficacy across a sample
of 138 entrepreneurs. We ground our theorizing and subsequent empirical tests in social
cognition theory and scholarship from entrepreneurship relating counterfactual thoughts
to entrepreneurial action. We build from the extant findings that frequent, intense, and
unpleasant counterfactual thoughts will have a negative impact on the individual’s per-
ceptions of entrepreneurial self-efficacy (Baron, 1997). However, we then take a step
beyond extant research to explore contingency situations where the dispositional psychol-
ogy of the individual may moderate the extent to which regretful thinking has a negative
influence on levels of entrepreneurial self-efficacy. We suggest that this study makes three
primary contributions.
First, this research represents a meaningful step toward clarifying the role of coun-
terfactual thinking in the entrepreneurial process. Our results highlight conditions under
which counterfactual thinking might benefit the entrepreneur (and by extension the
venture), and also conditions under which counterfactual thinking may significantly
impede action by reducing entrepreneurial self-efficacy. We suggest that both of these
conditions represent contingencies driven by the dispositional psychology of the entre-
preneur; that is, our findings highlight how and under what conditions counterfactual
thinking might be beneficial to some and limiting to others in an entrepreneurial context.
Second, this study is positioned as an empirical bridge between counterfactual thinking
and dispositional affect, two constructs proposed as important to entrepreneurship (Baron,
2000, 2008). Baron (2008) suggests that the “interface between affect and cognition is
both continuous and pervasive” (p. 328). In a way complementary to this suggestion, we
explore how the dispositional affect of the entrepreneur might inform the relationship
between counterfactual thinking and entrepreneurial self-efficacy. Our findings suggest
that the more positive the affect, the more engaging in counterfactual thinking serves to
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increase entrepreneurial self-efficacy. However, we also hypothesize that exactly the
opposite is true for those entrepreneurs assuming a negative affect. Finally, we aim to
highlight practical implications related to the development of prescriptive strategies for
entrepreneurs in terms of learning from past experiences and moving forward in the face
of both terminal (i.e., bankruptcy) and intermediate (i.e., not getting a loan, etc.) failures.
We argue that some individuals are better suited to apply past experiences through
counterfactual thoughts as a means toward developing strategies appropriate for future
“entrepreneuring”—and based on our findings, we suggest prescriptions for both the
pedagogy and practice of entrepreneurship.
Theorectical Development
Social Cognition
The social cognition theory (SCT) represents an approach to the study of human
cognition and information processing that assumes the motivations, emotions, and other
attributes of the individual impact cognition and subsequently how the individual inter-
prets the social world (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Showers & Cantor, 1985; Tetlock, 1990).
Operario and Fiske note that contemporary research within cognitive social psychology
has “abandoned a unidimensional view of social thinkers, now treating them as compli-
cated entities who bring their own values, experiences, knowledge structures, and personal
motivations to social perception and interaction” (Operario & Fiske, 1999, p. 67). Fun-
damental to understanding cognitive processing and outcomes, proponents of social
cognition assert, is to understand the goals, emotions, and motivations of the individual
actor within the context of the situation. Although we might envision abstract cognitive
processes such as reasoning and the development of counterfactual thoughts as devoid of
context, research has found that different forms of reasoning vary in their domain speci-
ficity (Markman & Gentner, 2001). Further, psychological research demonstrates that
individual motivations influence the development and selection of cognitive strategies
(Earley, Connolly, & Lee, 1989; Kahneman, 1973; Staw & Boettger, 1990), such that
certain motivational states activate specific cognitive interpretations (e.g., opportunities
for creating new business ventures) based on characteristics of the context (Schacter,
1996).
Specifically, a social cognition lens assumes that the attributes representative of a
given situation, reflection, or social situation become more or less salient as a function of
how those attributes relate to the emotions and motivations of the individual. Consider this
process as akin to taking a mental snapshot, and then assigning meaning to what you see
in the picture. Not all elements representative of the situation or reflection are considered
equally. In effect, the SCT suggests that some individuals may be more “sensitized” than
others to certain elements or characteristics of this mental picture as a function of their
own emotions, motivations, and other idiosyncratic attributes. As such, how an individual
makes sense of a given situation is, to a large extent, a function of the emotions and
motivations of the perceiver. Thus, the SCT is positioned to inform our understanding of
how individual differences may impact how individuals interpret, and subsequently
respond to, counterfactual thoughts—specifically as a function of the dispositional
attributes of the individual “thinker.”
Counterfactual Thinking
Counterfactual thinking involves comparing actual events to “alternatives that are
constructed ad hoc rather than retrieved from past experience” (Kahneman & Miller,
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1986, p. 136). Counterfactual thoughts represent “alternative versions of the past” where
the individual compares their current circumstance to some envisioned worse (downward
counterfactual), or better (upward counterfactual) outcome (Roese, 1997, pp. 133–134).
The basis of the difference between upward and downward counterfactuals relates to the
person’s interpretation of the situation. Individuals may use counterfactuals to learn from
the past (preparative function), and also to comfort themselves and others (affective
function; Johnson & Sherman, 1990; Roese, 1994). In an affective role, for example,
Roese (1994) suggests that, “people can strategically use downward counterfactuals to
make themselves feel better” (p. 816). Sanna, Meier, and Turley-Ames (1998, p. 267)
substantiated this notion by finding evidence for counterfactual thinking as a “mood-
repair strategy.” Similarly, Taylor, Wood, and Lichtman (1983) illustrate how cancer
patients sometimes find solace by arguing that their illness “could have been even worse.”
In a preparative role, counterfactual thinking is central to experiential learning.
Research suggests counterfactual thinking to be a logical requirement in seeking expla-
nations of causation, posing alternatives, and estimating the value of our explanations
under other conditions (Ferguson, 1997). The process of counterfactual thinking neces-
sarily involves deconstruction of a past incident into smaller components, which serves to
facilitate future-orientated sensemaking. This process effectively redefines the outcomes
associated with either the antecedents or the consequences (or both) of established facts
(Hoch, 1985), and as a result allows the individual to conceptualize what went wrong,
what needs to be changed, or how future events can be better controlled. In addition,
research suggests that some individual levels of preparedness for the future may be served
by counterfactuals that help identify the schemas for future action and propel the formu-
lation of plans necessary for success (e.g., Johnson & Sherman, 1990; Markman, Gavan-
ski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; Roese, 1994).
Theories of social comparison, which Roese (1994) suggests are the theoretical origin
of the counterfactual thought, provide support for the preparative role of counterfactual
thinking (Collins, 1996; Wood, 1999). Similarly, Taylor and Lobel (1989) demonstrate
that people coping with negative life events find the most pertinent preparative informa-
tion from comparisons with better-off people. According to Markman et al. (1993), the
motivations underlying the social comparisons and counterfactual thoughts may mirror
each other. Put differently, “thoughts of what might have been yield useful prescriptions
for future behavior, heightening success-facilitating intentions and corresponding behav-
iors” (Roese, p. 815).
Counterfactual Thinking in Entrepreneurship
Given that one of the defining attributes of entrepreneurship is the notion of decision
making in the face of uncertainty, scholars have suggested that counterfactual thinking
may help further the entrepreneurial process because inherent in counterfactual thoughts
are mechanisms through which the individual deconstructs the past to make sense of the
present—in preparation for future actions and events. Thus, such cognitions are necessary
antecedents to entrepreneurial action in the face of an unknowable future (Baron, 2000;
Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1994).
However to date, research focused at the interface of counterfactual thinking and
entrepreneurship has been equivocal. Some researchers suggest that entrepreneurs can
remain positive about the future because they tend to focus only on current events and
ignore past outcomes (Baron, 2000; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1994). Similarly, Gartner,
Bird, and Starr (1992) posit that entrepreneurs maintain a certainty bias, a propensity to
believe that equivocal events are certain to occur. These scholars support Baron’s (1997,
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p. 82) contention that “entrepreneurs engage in counterfactual thinking about past events
less frequently than others.” Other scholars, however, suggest that counterfactual thinking
may have an important impact on entrepreneurial self-efficacy, actions, and outcomes
(Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008; Markman, Baron, & Balkin, 2005; Zhao et al., 2005). For
example, Markman, Balkin, and Baron (2002) demonstrate that inventors who start a new
business tend to have higher self-efficacy related to the task, but also more intense
counterfactual thoughts. In a separate study, the same authors report that entrepreneurs
experience a greater number and more intense regrets, concurrently with higher levels of
perseverance and self-efficacy (Markman et al.). Similarly, Gaglio (2004) relates coun-
terfactuals to opportunity recognition, and suggests that since counterfactual thinking
involves deconstructing and reconstructing scenarios, such thought processes may result
in the identification of otherwise unforeseen opportunities. A study by Gaglio and Katz
(2001, p. 99) substantiates this contention, suggesting that, “counterfactual thinking and
mental simulations facilitate the reassessment process and may (but do not always)
indicate that it is necessary to radically alter the contents or the relational dynamics of
schema and the existing means-ends framework.” This process of alteration and recon-
struction may suggest insights into future market opportunities.
In the end, the equivocal nature of the findings with regard to counterfactual thinking
in entrepreneurship mirrors findings in other decision contexts, like parenting, education,
and career choice (Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995a, 1995b; Roese & Summerville,
2005). We suggest that one source of the ambiguity with regard to the role of counter-
factual thinking in the entrepreneurship literature may be the implicit assumption that
all individuals “use” counterfactual thoughts in the same way; when in fact, given the
prescriptions of the SCT, it is likely that the affective and emotional consequences of
counterfactual comparison may be shaped by individual differences represented by dis-
positional attributes of the entrepreneur (Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof,
1990). Thus, we suggest that the ambiguity represented in the literature may hint at a more
complex relationship than suggested by previous research.
Efficacy and Entrepreneurship
In this study, we represent entrepreneurial self-efficacy as an important antecedent to
entrepreneurial action (Bandura, 1978; Zhao et al., 2005). Self-efficacy refers to the belief
in one’s capabilities to organize and execute actions required to manage prospective
situations (Bandura). Self-efficacy has been applied in contexts as diverse as education,
learning, health, business, and entrepreneurship to measure not just the belief, but also the
actual likelihood of taking action. Schunk and Zimmerman (1997), for example, show that
when compared with students who doubt their learning capacities, those with a higher
self-efficacy for particular tasks participate more readily, work harder, persist longer when
they encounter difficulties, and achieve at a higher level. Such studies support Bandura’s
contention that what people believe influences their motivations and actions, whether or
not the belief is objectively true. Further, he argues that behavior can be predicted by
self-efficacy, as it determines what people will do with their knowledge and skills. For
example, Krueger and Dickson (1994) suggest that where determining behavior is con-
cerned, an individual’s perceptions of their own skill can be more important than the
objective skills themselves. Thus, the prospective entrepreneur who believes he or she can
start a new business is likely to pursue this course of action whether he or she possesses
the set of skills necessary to do so or not.
Along these lines, previous research in entrepreneurship has indicated that self-
efficacy represents a proxy for other more “objective” measures of entrepreneurial
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performance (cf. Baron, 1999, 2008; Chen, Greene, & Crick, 1998) and has indicated that
it is connected to opportunity recognition (Krueger & Brazeal, 1994), career intention, and
the decision to pursue an entrepreneurial career (Kickul, Gundry, Barbosa, & Whitkanack,
2009). For example, entrepreneurial self-efficacy is seen as one of the determinants of
the set of potential options an individual has for action (Kickul et al.), in a way consistent
with Markman et al.’s (2002) finding that inventors who possessed higher levels of
self-efficacy chose to start their own ventures while those with lower levels of self-efficacy
chose to work in established firms. Chen et al. provide further evidence that higher levels
of entrepreneurial self-efficacy are tied to intentions to start a new venture (i.e., pursue an
entrepreneurial career), strengthening the argument that scholars have made that entre-
preneurial self-efficacy is an important antecedent to entrepreneurial action (Boyd &
Vozikis, 1994). Further research has indicated that education and related experiences
can influence individuals’ levels of entrepreneurial self-efficacy and that these changes
may impact entrepreneurial outcomes. For example, Segal, Borgia, and Schoenfeld (2002)
found that certain educational initiatives were successful in boosting students’ entrepre-
neurial self-efficacy by enhancing their expectations of the potential for, and possibility of,
positive outcomes from entrepreneurial action.
Thus, given the equivocal nature of prior research focused on the relationship between
counterfactual thoughts and entrepreneurial outcomes, as a “jumping-off” point toward
teasing apart the interplay between the psychology of the individual and the impacts of
counterfactual thinking, we suggest that: (1) because negative events tend to trigger more
counterfactuals than positive ones (Roese & Hur, 1997), and (2) because intermediate and
terminal failure characterize the entrepreneurial experience, it is likely that increases in
the frequency, intensity, and unpleasantness of the counterfactual will have a negative
impact on the entrepreneur’s subsequent efficacy toward entrepreneurship:
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, as the intensity, frequency, and unpleasantness of
counterfactual thinking increases, entrepreneurial self-efficacy decreases.
Counterfactual Thinking and Individual Differences
Empirical evidence from entrepreneurship, considered in concert with studies from
other decision contexts, suggests that counterfactual thinking can be beneficial, but may
also result in inaction and paralyzing regret. As highlighted above, while prior research
has focused on the implications of counterfactuals for entrepreneurship, less studied are
the relationships between counterfactual thinking and individual personality attributes. Do
different dispositional “types” of people use counterfactuals differently? More specifi-
cally, might the attributes of the individual differently influence the hypothesized rela-
tionship (hypothesis 1) between counterfactual thinking and entrepreneurial self-efficacy?
There is implicit and explicit evidence from other disciplines to suggest that this may be
the case.
For example, in an experimental study designed to investigate differences in the
desirability of sticking with one’s first answer on an exam, or changing the answer upon
reflection, Kruger, Wirtz, and Miller (2005) show that sticking with the first answer—
rather than switching—generates stronger, more salient counterfactual thoughts than does
the act of changing from a wrong to a correct answer. Importantly, individuals with higher
levels of self-esteem believe more strongly in the decision to change answers (or, by
extension, to follow a given entrepreneurial opportunity), and will thus be less likely to be
impacted by counterfactual reflections. Like self-esteem, dispositional affect is also likely
to impact the content of the counterfactual generated, which Walsh and Byrne (2004) have
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shown can have an important influence on the mutability of the facts under consideration.
For example, an individual who chooses to leave a stable, lucrative, full-time job to pursue
a given business opportunity, only to see his or her venture fail, can approach the situation
by mutating the events as they occurred, or by considering the past and ascribing fault for
the failure (Mandel & Lehman, 1996). Thus, while Roese (1997) posits that counterfactual
thinking is activated by negative affect, we suggest dispositional levels of self-esteem
and affect may also impact the relationship between counterfactual thinking and subse-
quent outcomes. We explore both affect and self-esteem, in turn, as attributes of the
entrepreneur that may serve to moderate the general hypothesis that as the intensity,
frequency, and unpleasantness of counterfactual thinking increases, entrepreneurial self-
efficacy decreases.
Dispositional Affect. Affect is central to the process of an individual’s interaction with
stimuli, and refers to the experience of feeling or emotion. It indicates an instinctual
reaction to stimulation occurring before the typical cognitive processes considered nec-
essary for the formation of a more complex emotion. Zajonc (1980) asserts that this
reaction to stimuli is a primary determinant of behavior for human beings; individuals’
reactions to the clues from their environment are likely to be shaped by their affective
state. Individuals in positive affect are likely to receive and interpret bad news in a positive
light, while those in negative affect are likely to give an unfavorable spin even to good
news. Thus, affect is expected to play a critical role in the relationship between counter-
factual thinking and entrepreneurial self-efficacy. As Baron (2000, p. 80) indicates, “a
large body of literature suggests that . . . negative affect can, in turn, strongly color
perceptions, leading individuals to view situations or events less favorably—for instance,
as riskier or potentially more costly.” Such findings are also consistent with a social
cognition lens. Fundamental to understanding cognition, proponents of social cognition
assert, is to understand the goals, emotions, and motivations of the individual actor within
the context of the situation. It is impossible to separate the actor from the context, in that
the actor constructs mental maps to facilitate reasoning based on inputs from the envi-
ronment. Affective dispositions will influence how context is perceived and interpreted
(Griffin & Ross, 1991; Schacter, 1996). At the same time, context may impact an indi-
vidual’s affect (Wyer & Srull, 1989). Further, high activation emotions—ones that elicit
strong arousal (e.g., passion, excitement, etc.)1—are likely to be more salient to the
individual, and thus be strongly encoded into memory. Entrepreneurial regrets, given the
strong psychological linkage between the entrepreneur and the venture (Haynie et al.,
2009), are likely to represent high activation emotions. Ultimately, how such emotions are
encoded serves as the basis for the development and employment of cognitive strategies
positioned to process and make sense of a social situation or outcome, and subsequently
impact behavior, judgment, and choice. As such, drawing from both extant scholarship on
counterfactual thinking and also the prescriptions of social cognition theory, we expect
that the frequency, intensity, and unpleasantness of counterfactual thinking will impact
entrepreneurial self-efficacy such that:
Hypothesis 2: The negative relationship between counterfactual thoughts (intensity,
frequency, and [un]pleasantness) and entrepreneurial self-efficacy becomes less nega-
tive as dispositional affect becomes more positive.
1. Higher and lower levels of activation, along with higher and lower levels of pleasantness, represent axes
upon which a circumplex model of emotion can be constructed (cf. Feldman Barnett & Russell, 1998; Russell,
1980; Russell & Feldman Barnett, 1999).
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Self-esteem. Self-esteem refers to a person’s evaluation of self, and research generally
suggests evidence to support the notion of chronic—or dispositional—levels of self-
esteem across individuals. Becker (1971, p. 79) suggested that self-esteem refers to the
feeling that “one is an object of primary value in a world of meaningful action,” implying
that self-esteem is a culturally defined and perpetuated phenomenon (see also, Pyszczyn-
ski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004).
Extant research suggests a positive relationship between counterfactual thinking and
self-esteem. For example, in a study focused on regret related to past inaction, Feeney
and coauthors found that regret was confined to those with a high level of self-esteem
(Feeney, Gardiner, Johnston, Jones, & McEvoy, 2005); that is, those with high self-
esteem regretted inaction as they would have missed opportunities. Sociometer theory
has suggested that self-esteem acts as a sort of gauge that indicates for us the relative
quality of our interpersonal relationships (Leary, 1999; Leary & Downs, 1995). The
prehistoric, prelinguistic need for humans to exist in groups led to the development of
self-esteem as a tool for internalizing others’ reactions to our actions, allowing for
adjustment of individuals’ behavior. In other words, esteem provides ongoing feedback
regarding an individual’s relational value (as compared to others), suggesting self-
esteem as a gauge of the degree to which an individual is socially accepted or rejected
(Leary). Pyszczynski and coauthors (2004) focus on self-esteem as a “shielding”
mechanism through the lens of terror management theory, demonstrating that self-
esteem functions to mitigate fears of one’s mortality; higher self-esteem serves to
reduce fear and anxiety related to death.
The research cited here—while grounded in disparate domains and theoretical
frameworks—illustrates how self-esteem impacts the manner in which the individual
interprets and subsequently behaves in the context of a social environment. By defini-
tion, counterfactual thinking is the process of decomposing and reconstructing past
events; as such, counterfactual reflections represent opportunities to expose the indi-
vidual to mental “replays” of significant past events. The subsequent impact of these
reflections on future attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors is likely to be defined—in
part—by the self-esteem of the individual. For example, just as high self-esteem may
lessen the impacts of fear related to death (Pyszczynski et al., 2004), in the same way
levels of self-esteem are likely to moderate effects of fear of failure (mortality) of the
entrepreneurial venture or a missed opportunity—common regrets of entrepreneurs.
Thus, we propose that self-esteem will moderate the relationship between regret and
entrepreneurial self-efficacy such that:
Hypothesis 3: The negative relationship between counterfactual thoughts (intensity,
frequency, and [un]pleasantness) and entrepreneurial self-efficacy becomes less nega-
tive as levels of dispositional self-esteem increase.
The relationships proposed above are conceptually summarized in Figure 1.
Ultimately, we believe that incorporating attributes of the individual (in our case
dispositional levels of self-esteem and affect) into our analysis opens the door to more
precisely addressing important questions that have remained unanswered in the context of
counterfactual thinking and entrepreneurship. The conceptual model represented here,
consistent with our theoretical development, represents the influences of affect and
self-esteem as moderating the relationship between counterfactual thoughts and entrepre-
neurial self-efficacy; that is, assuming that the entrepreneur engages in counterfactual
thinking, we investigate how dispositional affect and self-esteem might influence what we
propose to be an otherwise negative relationship between counterfactuals and entrepre-
neurial self-efficacy. We acknowledge that attributes of personality—such as affect and
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self-esteem—might also influence the likelihood that an individual may engage in coun-
terfactual thinking; however, this question is beyond the scope of our theorizing and
empirical design. Put simply, our purpose is to test, given the nature of counterfactual
thoughts in terms of frequency, intensity, and unpleasantness, (1) what are the influences
on entrepreneurial self-efficacy, and (2) how are those influences impacted by personality
attributes of the individual doing the “thinking.” To this end, in what follows we present
our sample, research design, methods, and detail our findings.
Method
Research Design and Sample
Participants in the study include entrepreneurs identified through their association
with a sample of business incubators from across the United States. We employed a
two-stage random sampling technique. In the first stage, 20 incubators were randomly
selected from a directory of business incubators. In the second stage, 240 entrepreneurs
were randomly selected from mailing lists provided by the incubators, and asked to
complete our survey instrument online. These mailing lists included past clients of the
incubators (entrepreneurs whose ventures “graduated” from the incubator), as well as
current clients of the incubator. Of those surveyed, 138 entrepreneurs completed the
instrument (57.5% response rate). Both the sample size and the response rate are com-
parable to—or exceed—previous studies focused on the interface of counterfactual think-
ing and entrepreneurship. We attribute our high response rate to our adherence to the
suggestions of Dillman (2000), which are purported to encourage high levels of partici-
pation in research programs; these suggestions include personalized correspondence and
multiple follow-up contacts.
Of the entrepreneurs represented in our sample, 94 were male and 44 female, with an
average age of 40.96 years. On average, the entrepreneurs surveyed had founded 2.36
ventures (standard deviation [SD] = 1.39). Forty-six of the entrepreneurs had graduated
from business schools (33.3%), and another 41 (29.7%) with university-level degrees in
science and engineering. Importantly, the entrepreneurs represented in our sample were




of 51.17 hours (SD = 10.82) per week actively managing their ventures. All respondents
represented ventures that were, at the time of their participation in this study, producing
and selling some product or service.
Variables and Measures
Entrepreneurial Self-Efficacy. The dependent variable in this study is entrepreneurial
self-efficacy. To capture entrepreneurial self-efficacy, we administered a measure devel-
oped by Zhao et al. (2005). This scale is grounded in past research on self-efficacy in
entrepreneurship (e.g., Chen et al., 1998; Markman et al., 2002, 2005), and consists of
items that direct entrepreneurs to rate their confidence in “successfully identifying new
business opportunities, creating new products, thinking creatively, and commercializing
an idea or new development” (Zhao et al., p. 1268). The instrument is scored on a 1 (no
confidence) to 5 (complete confidence)-point Likert scale, and makes a holistic assess-
ment of entrepreneurial self-efficacy (Zhao et al.). The Cronbach’s alpha for the entre-
preneurial self-efficacy scale in this research was 0.83.
Counterfactual Thinking. Counterfactual thinking, our independent variable of primary
interest, was captured following a design adapted from Baron (1999) and Markman et al.
(2002, 2005). As in these prior studies, each respondent was asked to list three regrets that
were specifically related to their role as an entrepreneur. Then, the entrepreneur was asked
to indicate the frequency, intensity, and unpleasantness of each of those reflections on a
7-point Likert scale. Frequency refers to how often the entrepreneur reflects on his/her
regrets, and constructs counterfactual scenarios (from never, to all the time). Intensity
refers to the depth of feeling with which they reflect on these scenarios. Unpleasantness
captures how agreeable (or not) the entrepreneur finds reflecting on these scenarios. This
data was captured for each of the three regrets reported by the entrepreneurs. We include
examples of the regrets cited by our sample in Appendix 1.
While prior research on counterfactual thinking has demonstrated that the frequency
of regret, intensity, and unpleasantness of the counterfactual thought impacts entrepre-
neurial self-efficacy (Baron, 1999; Markman & Miller, 2006; Markman et al., 2002,
2005), this literature does not necessarily suggest a clear and consistent path forward for
scholars with regard to the role that these dimensions together play in informing the
construct of counterfactual thinking; that is, prior studies do not make a clear theoretical
case for the appropriateness of whether to use these three subdimensions together as a
composite scale, to use them individually as separate scales, or to combine some dimen-
sions and not others. For example, Markman et al. (2002) asked only that entrepreneurs
indicate how many regrets they had, and how they experienced those regrets. Baron, on the
other hand, asked the entrepreneurs to rate three regrets on all of the three subdimensions
(as we did here), but in turn tested frequency of regret as an independent construct, while
choosing to combine intensity and unpleasantness. Baron implies that the robustness of
the counterfactual thought is improved when the entrepreneur is directed to consider each
of the three dimensions, but says little by way of theoretical or empirical reasoning to
explain why frequency of regret was represented independently in the model, while
intensity and unpleasantness were combined as a single construct.
Like Baron (1999), we believe that it is important to make the entrepreneurs specifi-
cally think through all three subdimensions to get a robust measure of the true nature of
counterfactual thinking. However, unlike Baron, we decided to construct a composite
counterfactual thinking measure by computing the average score for each dimension of
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the three counterfactual reflections (frequency, intensity, and unpleasantness), and then
collapsing the three responses (three regrets) per entrepreneur into a single score.2 We
chose this path for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretically, prior research
(e.g., Baron) suggests that whether entrepreneurs think often and not so intensely about
only a few unpleasant regrets, or less often but more intensely about many regrets, the
consequences of such regretful thinking on outcomes and behaviors are similar. As such,
there does not appear to be a theoretical reason to consider each dimension separately
given our research motivation and hypotheses. Empirically, factor analysis (detailed in our
results) revealed that the three dimensions that describe the regretful thoughts loaded
together on a single factor and worked in the same direction to inform the impact of the
regretful thought. We also conducted an analysis of reliability on the combined scale, and
the Cronbach’s alpha for the counterfactual thought scale was 0.87.3
Affect. Recent research indicates that positive and negative affect are distinct concepts
that are negatively related, with very low to negligible correlation between the two
(Crawford & Henry, 2004; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This stream of research
advocates using separate scales to capture positive and negative affect. Further, research
also indicates that affective scales when used with “short-term instructions (e.g., right now
or today) are sensitive to fluctuations in mood,” but exhibit trait-like stability when used
with longer term instructions (Watson et al., p. 1069). We adopted both of these recom-
mendations into the design of this study. In our study, we use the methodology suggested
by Watson et al., and employed two separate scales each with 10 items (the Positive Affect
Negative Affect Schedule, or PANAS) to measure positive and negative affect, respec-
tively. Further, we directed respondents to adopt a “long-term” orientation when complet-
ing the inventory in an effort to capture affect as trait-stable, consistent with the
recommendations of Watson et al. Scale items designed to capture positive affect included
questions focused on whether or not the respondent felt particularly excited or interested
in something, proud of their accomplishments, “on top of the world,” etc. Similarly,
negative affect was measured by items that addressed feelings of boredom and loneliness,
feeling “disconnected” from other people, feeling depressed or unhappy, being upset at
criticism, etc. The Cronbach’s alphas indicating the reliability of the positive and negative
affect scales were 0.84 and 0.74, respectively.
Self-Esteem. Self-esteem refers to a person’s overall appraisal of his or her own worth.
Self-esteem is generally regarded as an enduring personality characteristic, shaped by our
experiences over a lifetime. Rosenberg (1965) and social learning theorists have shown
that given its stable nature, it is measurable by self-report questionnaires. Given its long
history of reliability and validation, we use Rosenberg’s scale to measure self-esteem. The
questions on this scale ask respondents to rate their level of agreement (on a 7-point Likert
scale) to questions such as “I feel that I am a person of worth,” “I feel that I have a number
2. Each member of the author team independently coded each counterfactual reported by the respondents,
based on a hypothetical “exemplar” of both an upward and downward counterfactual statement. As to be
expected based on prior research, the overwhelming majority (98%) of the counterfactuals reported by our
sample were categorized as upward counterfactuals, and thus, only these upward counterfactual thoughts were
included in our analysis.
3. For added rigor, we conducted a sensitivity analysis to determine whether creating a composite counter-
factual thinking index (as opposed to including each variable separately in our model) would meaningfully
impact our results. The results of this analysis demonstrated that the results were substantively the same using
either approach.
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of good qualities,” and “I am able to do things as well as most other people.” Unlike
self-efficacy, which relates to a person’s belief in his ability to do a particular task (e.g.,
write, take an exam, ride a bicycle, etc.), self-esteem measures a person’s global belief in
him/herself (Bandura, 1989, 1997; Rosenberg; Schwoerer, May, Hollensbe, & Mencl,
2005; Wilson, Kickul, & Marlino, 2007).4 The Cronbach’s alpha for the self-esteem scale
in this research was 0.87.
Control Variables. Consistent with previous research in entrepreneurship (Chen et al.,
1998; Forbes, 2005; Markman et al., 2002, 2005; Wilson et al., 2007), we control for both
the gender and age of the entrepreneur because previous research has highlighted percep-
tible differences in the levels of self-efficacy among these categories of entrepreneurs.
Additionally, we also control for both the number of ventures that the entrepreneur has
founded (either as sole founder or as a team) and his status as sole founder or team member
in their venture. We suggest this control is important in the context of this study, because we
posit that working in a team may create a support structure that blunts the impact of
counterfactual thinking. We control for the number of hours devoted to the business to
control for levels of entrepreneurial involvement in and commitment to their venture.5
Instrumental Variables. The psychometric nature of both our independent and dependent
variables suggests the possibility of conjoint influences, and as such, we follow the
recommendations of Hausman (2001) and employ instrumental variables regression
(IVR) in our final model to test the robustness of our findings. We use Neugarten,
Havighurst, and Tobin’s (1961) Life Satisfaction Index (LSI) scale and Zung’s (1972)
depression scale as instruments in the IVR analysis. These scales form part and parcel of
Ryff’s (1989) psychological well-being scale, which again has been shown to be valid and
reliable in past research (e.g., Seifert, 2005). Thus, their use together as instrumental
variables is a matter of common practice. The Cronbach’s alphas were 0.70 and 0.67 for
the life satisfaction and depression scales, respectively.
Results
We employed hierarchical regression and ordinary least squares regression to test our
hypotheses. As detailed above, while we captured three measures related to each coun-
terfactual scenario, analysis of the data employing the principal component factoring
method suggested a single, underlying dimension for each counterfactual scenario; spe-
cifically, our analysis (at the level of the individual regret) clearly demonstrated that
frequency, intensity, and unpleasantness together loaded on a single factor, explaining
92% of the variance in the model. An examination of the resulting Scree plot confirmed
this finding. The “goodness-of-fit” of a factor model is assessed by comparing the
observed covariance with the covariance predicted by the model, and large discrepancies
between the observed and predicted covariance may indicate poor model fit. The algo-
rithm used to estimate the parameters in the model minimizes a chi-square statistic
that compares the observed and predicted covariance. For our results, we found the
goodness-of-fit test to be significant (p < 0.001), and therefore, we have no basis to reject
4. We used alpha and confirmatory factor analyses to confirm that self-esteem and self-efficacy are in fact
distinct constructs.
5. In our sensitivity analysis, we also run our model without any of these control variables, and our results
essentially remain the same.
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the null hypotheses that the discrepancy between the observed and predicted covariance is
equal to zero. Means and correlations are reported in Table 1. Shapiro–Wilk analysis of
the responses for each scale suggests a normal distribution.
Tests of our hypothesized relationships are reported as a series of three regression
models, presented in Table 2. Model 1 presents the regression of counterfactual thinking
and our control variables on entrepreneurial self-efficacy, and provides support for
hypothesis 1. This finding is consistent with prior research; however, it is important
to highlight that this finding is noteworthy in the face of novel controls employed in this
study—controls that have been suggested (but not employed) by past studies (e.g., Baron,
1999; Markman et al., 2002, 2005).6 Our findings indicate that as counterfactual thinking
increases (becomes more frequent, intense, and/or unpleasant), entrepreneurial self-
efficacy decreases (B = -0.13; p < 0.05). It is also noteworthy that experience in founding
ventures is significant in this model, and this represents a potentially interesting area for
future research.
Model 2 represents the complete main-effects model, and includes self-esteem and
both positive and negative affect as explanatory variables. While not hypothesized, all
three variables are statistically significant predictors of entrepreneurial self-efficacy, such
that moving from low to high positive affect (B = 0.18; p < 0.01) is positively related to
changes in entrepreneurial self-efficacy, and moving from low to high negative affect
(B = -0.21; p < 0.05) is negatively related to changes in entrepreneurial self-efficacy.
Similarly, moving from low to high self-esteem (B = 0.31, p < 0.01) is positively related
to changes in entrepreneurial self-efficacy.
Model 3—the full model—represents the hypothesized contingent relationships
(hypothesis 2 and 3) between counterfactual thinking and levels of self-esteem and affect.
All three interactions (CFT and positive affect [B = 0.39; p < .01]; CFT and negative affect
[B = -0.34, p < 0.05]; CFT and self-esteem [B = 0.32, p < 0.01]) were significant. To aid
in the interpretation, these interactions are plotted in Figures 2 (positive affect), 3 (nega-
tive affect), and 4 (self-esteem). High and low levels of affect and self-esteem are plotted
in relation to a y-axis of self-efficacy (the dependent variable), and an x-axis representing
counterfactual thinking. Following the recommendations of Cohen and Cohen (1983) and
Aiken and West (1991), high and low levels of the independent and moderator variables
are defined as one SD above and below the mean. Furthermore, Aiken and West recom-
mend the use of unstandardized, but centered, variables. They suggest that the uncentered
solutions are prone to severe multicollinearity that may result in “dramatically different
results” in regressions examining interactions. In contrast, use of centered solutions,
which involve additive transformation of variables by subtracting the mean from the
observed values, addresses the problem of multicollinearity while returning identical
slopes, standard errors, and t-test results. Thus, this approach has both methodological
rigor and ease of interpretability, and therefore we follow these guidelines in our inter-
action plots. Further, we conducted post hoc t-test analysis to test whether the slopes of the
lines indicated in the interaction plots were different from zero. Here, t is equal to the
simple slope divided by its standard error, with (n - k - 1) degrees of freedom, where n is
the sample size, and k is the number of predictors including the interaction term.
Specifically, Figure 2 plots the significant interaction between counterfactual think-
ing and positive affect, Figure 3 plots the interaction between counterfactual thinking
and negative affect, and Figure 4 plots the interaction between counterfactual thinking and
6. We include at least three additional controls that have not been considered in previous research: number of
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Table 2
Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables B SE B SE B SE
Intercept 4.2 0.27*** 4.41 0.19*** 4.44 0.18***
Gender -0.06 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.11
Age 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hours at work 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Individual or part of team 0.02 0.13 -0.08 0.1 -0.12 0.1
Number of ventures founded 0.11 0.04*** 0.06 0.02*** 0.07 0.02***
Upward counterfactual
thoughts (CFT)
-0.13 0.06** -0.07 0.06 -0.05 0.08
Positive affect (PA) 0.18 0.08** 0.26 0.06***
Negative affect (NA) -0.21 0.1** -0.29 0.05***
Self-esteem (EST) 0.31 0.08*** 0.33 0.1***
Interactions
PA ¥ CFT 0.39 1.06***
NA ¥ CFT -034 0.17**
EXT ¥ CFT 0.32 0.10***
R2 0.1*** 0.42*** 0.48***
DR2 0.32*** 0.06***
F 3.04 9.37 9.5
* p = <0.10, ** p = <0.05, *** p = <0.01; n = 136.
Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported.
SE, standard error.
Figure 2
Interaction of Positive Affect and CFT on Entrepreneurial Self-Efficacy






























self-esteem. Figure 2 indicates that moving from low to high counterfactual thinking (left
to right on the x-axis), the negative relationship between upward counterfactual thinking
and entrepreneurial self-efficacy becomes more negative for those with low positive
affect, and more positive for those with high positive affect. The post hoc t-test analysis
of the simple slopes confirmed that both the upper and lower lines in the plot have slopes
that are significantly different from zero (p < 0.05) and from each other (p < 0.01).
Figure 3
Interaction of Negative Affect and CFT on Entrepreneurial Self-Efficacy






























Interaction of Self-Esteem and CFT on Entrepreneurial Self-Efficacy
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Figure 3 plots the significant interaction between counterfactual thinking and negative
affect. As with positive affect, moving from low to high counterfactual thinking (left to
right on the x-axis), the negative relationship between counterfactual thinking and entre-
preneurial self-efficacy becomes more negative for those with high negative affect, and
less negative for those with low negative affect. As with positive affect, post hoc analysis
of the simple slopes confirms that both the upper and lower lines in the plot have slopes
that are significantly different from zero (p < 0.05) and from each other (p < 0.05).
Finally, Figure 4 plots the significant interaction between counterfactual thinking and
self-esteem. As with positive and negative affect, the plot highlights that moving from low
to high counterfactual thinking (left to right on the x-axis), the positive relationship
between counterfactual thinking and entrepreneurial self-efficacy becomes more positive
for those with high self-esteem and less positive for those with low self-esteem. As with
positive and negative affect, the post hoc analysis of the simple slopes confirms that both
the upper and lower lines in the plot have slopes that are significantly different from zero
(p < 0.10 for the upper line and p < 0.05 for the lower line) and from each other (p < 0.05).
In fact, all three plots suggest that moving from low to high levels of counterfactual
thinking actually confers benefits to those with high self-esteem, high positive affect, and
low negative affect, increasing entrepreneurial self-efficacy.
Finally, IVR is employed in our final models to test the robustness of our findings
given that the psychometric nature of both our independent and dependant variables
suggests the possibility of endogeneity (Hausman, 2001). We use Neugarten and col-
leagues’ (1961) LSI scale as an instrument for self-esteem and Zung’s (1972) depression
scale as an instrument for positive and negative affect (PANAS scale). An instrumental
variable should be significantly related to the variable assumed to be endogenous, but not
significantly related to the dependent variable. As noted above, these scales form part and
parcel of Ryff’s (1989) psychological well-being scale, which again has been shown to be
valid and reliable in past research (e.g., Seifert, 2005), and their use together as instru-
ments is a matter of common practice. Results in models 4 and 5 of Table 3 confirm that
even after using instruments, the regression results detailed above remain significant.
Discussion and Conclusion
As detailed throughout this paper, previous research on counterfactual thinking in
entrepreneurship has produced ambiguous and equivocal results. The findings represented
by this study suggest a path forward for future research positioned to link “what might
have been” with “what yet may be.”
To begin, this research is the first to consider empirically the proposition that
attributes of the person doing the “thinking” may influence differently the outcomes
associated with counterfactual thoughts. Our findings suggest that the dispositional
attributes of the individual may have important implications for the relationship
between counterfactual thinking and behaviors and outcomes. This research opens the
door for entrepreneurship scholars to further tease apart the complex relationship
between behavior, action, and outcomes given past events and experiences. Consider
that the importance of experience and prior knowledge as an antecedent to future entre-
preneurship is a theme represented throughout the literature (Shane, 2000). To that end,
our research suggests a danger in broad generalizations in terms of how past events
are reflected in entrepreneurial outcomes, and the lens adopted in this study focuses
future research toward a careful consideration of the attributes of the individual as a
conduit through which those past experiences are interpreted and acted upon. While we
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hypothesized a significant moderation of the negative relationship between counterfac-
tual thinking and entrepreneurial self-efficacy as a function of levels of affect and self-
esteem, our results painted a picture beyond our original theorizing; that is, it appears
from our findings that in the face of high levels of affect and self-esteem, the hypoth-
esized negative relationship between counterfactual thinking and entrepreneurial self-
efficacy actually turns positive. These findings highlight some counterintuitive insights
worthy of additional consideration.
Consider that Baron’s recent work seems to use affect and mood state interchangeably
in his discussion of mood congruence and mood-dependent memory (Baron, 2008). The
foundation of Baron’s logic is that “current moods strongly determine which information
in a given situation is noticed and entered into memory” and that “affect also influences
what specific information is retrieved from memory” (Baron, p. 330). The implication is
that when experiencing an impactful event or outcome, whether the individual assumes a
positive or negative affect state will influence how that event is stored in memory, or
indeed whether it is stored at all. It seems as though over time, the individual’s interpre-
tation of the memory will then change depending on contemporary states of affect and on
subsequent memories. Subsequent experiences will change the way in which we interpret
that initial experience. It is likely that this tendency is related to the degree to which
dispositional attributes such as affect and esteem endure over time. To this end, it is also
important to acknowledge in future tests of the relationship between dispositional
attributes and counterfactual thinking that retrospective bias plays a central role in coun-
terfactual thinking—as by definition, all counterfactual thoughts are retrospective. This
fact has implications for study design, methodology, and also for theory.
Throughout the entrepreneurship literature, there has been substantial concern about
the problem of retrospection (Gartner, 1989; Shaver & Scott, 1991). Probably the most
relevant of these concerns to the study of counterfactual thinking is that retrospective
Table 3
IVR Regression Results
Model 4 Model 5
DV: Entrepreneurial self-efficacy B SE B SE
Intercept -1.26 1.2 -0.09 1.14
Gender 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.11
Age 0 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Hours at work 0 0 0 0
Individual or part of team -0.18 0.15 -0.22 0.23
Number of ventures founded 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06
Counterfactual thoughts (CFT) -0.1 0.07 0.05 0.09
Affect (PANAS Scale)1 0.91 0.45** 0.63 0.36*
Self-esteem (EST) 1.14 0.37*** 0.98 0.43**
Affect ¥ CFT 0.23 0.06***
EST ¥ CFT 0.12 0.05**
Adj. R2 0.37*** 0.56***
DR2 0.19***
Wald c2 28.59
* p = <0.10, ** p = <0.05, *** p = <0.01; n = 136.
Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported.
DV, dependent variable; SE, standard error; PANAS, Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule.
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accounts (which describe counterfactual thoughts) have been shown to be influenced by
a self-justification bias (Carter, Gartner, Shaver, & Gatewood, 2003). Such a bias could
impact the “true nature” of the regret; for example, research has demonstrated that, over
time, individuals “justify” the choices they made in the past, and thus, the influence of
those choices on future actions and behaviors is lessened (Golden, 1992; Huber & Power,
1985). This aspect of retrospection highlights several implications for the study of coun-
terfactual thinking. First, future research might ask entrepreneurs to detail regrets within
a very proximal time period, as opposed to opening the door to more distal regrets.
Second, this discussion highlights the opportunity to add a dimension to the counterfactual
construct. In addition to frequency, intensity, and unpleasantness, future researchers might
include a measure to capture the degree to which some cited regret may either influence
or subsequently inform the actions, attitudes, or choices made by the entrepreneur when
performing entrepreneurial tasks. Such a dimension could add to the robustness of the
counterfactual thinking measure and serve as a control for the self-justification bias that
is characteristic of retrospection. Additionally, affect is represented in the literature as
somewhat more enduring than mood state (which tends to be described as situational), and
self-esteem is represented as a more enduring disposition than affect. Given our findings,
the extent to which counterfactual thinking can (or does) influence the degree to which
these constructs persist over time represents another area for future research to consider.
For example, our finding that when individuals with high esteem engage in counter-
factual thinking entrepreneurial self-efficacy increases, suggests that counterfactual
thoughts are insufficient to undermine a strong sense of self-esteem that has developed
over a lifetime. Conversely, it is still unknown whether counterfactual thoughts would be
able to positively influence self-esteem in any long-term sense. Our findings raise similar
questions with regard to the relationship between affect and counterfactual thinking, and
highlight opportunities for both entrepreneurship and psychology scholars. It is quite
possible that additional attributes of the individual (beyond affect and self-esteem)
may also moderate the relationship between counterfactual thinking and entrepreneurial
self-efficacy.
For example, work in entrepreneurship on how an individual’s locus of control may
influence entrepreneurial outcomes and actions has demonstrated that locus of control
impacts individuals’ perceptions about future actions (Lumpkin & Dess, 1986; Poon,
Ainuddin, & Junit, 2006); thus, it is likely that an individual’s orientation with regard to
locus of control may also moderate the relationship between counterfactual thinking and
entrepreneurial self-efficacy. In the context of our findings, this suggests an important
avenue for future research focused on the relationship among locus of control, counter-
factual thinking, and entrepreneurial self-efficacy. Similar to the influences of affect and
self-esteem, might an individual’s locus of control differently moderate how individuals
interpret counterfactual thoughts in a way that impacts entrepreneurial self-efficacy?
Further, how might locus of control possibly interact with dispositional attributes of
personality to influence entrepreneurial self-efficacy in response to frequent, intense,
and/or unpleasant counterfactual thoughts? These are all important questions that are
beyond the scope of our data to address, although they represent interesting opportunities
for scholars.
In addition, future research may consider the possibility of a mediating role of
self-esteem and affect, with regard to the relationship between counterfactual thinking and
entrepreneurial self-efficacy. While beyond the scope of our theorizing, post hoc analysis
(Sobel test, Aroian test, Goodman test) were used to consider whether self-esteem, and
positive affect and negative affect together, might mediate the relationship between
counterfactual thoughts and entrepreneurial self-efficacy. These tests were equivocal;
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however, future research based on more complex research designs—possibly a laboratory
experiment—may further tease apart these complex relationships. Importantly, we
acknowledge that failure represented by a counterfactual thought can be informative
(Minniti & Bygrave, 2001) and, in some cases, can have positive impacts on individuals’
learning, on the development of new attitudes towards risk, and other outcomes that may
positively impact self-efficacy (cf. Newton, Khanna, & Thompson, 2008). This fact also
represents a nuance related to ongoing efforts to tease apart the relationship between
counterfactual thinking and self-efficacy, which should serve to motivate future research.
With regard to the teaching and practice of entrepreneurship, our findings suggest that
it may be important, for example, to provide training to aspiring entrepreneurs in terms of
understanding themselves in the context of how such an understanding may influence their
interpretations of past entrepreneurial events. Further, our findings would seem to indicate
that a critical mechanism of such an understanding may involve processes related to
self-reflection and self-regulation on past entrepreneurial experiences, events, and endeav-
ors. This implication from our findings motivated us to explore mechanisms positioned to
promote such self-reflection and self-regulation as avenues for future research. Drawing
from the extant entrepreneurship literature, we focused on the connection between our
findings, metacognition, and the research on how entrepreneurs experience failure.
Entrepreneurship scholars have begun to consider the ways in which the experience
of failure can be harnessed, for example, in teaching entrepreneurship students how to
manage emotional reactions to failure (Shepherd, 2004). Considering the effectiveness of
such techniques as error management training (Keith & Frese, 2005), we see the potential
in placing entrepreneurship students in experiential learning situations in which they are
set up to make mistakes and fail, and in which they learn ways of recognizing and
harnessing the counterfactual thoughts that are expected to result from these situations.
Practice and experience with errors and failure should cause learners to stop to consider
the causes of and their reactions to these errors, including the counterfactual thoughts
(Keith & Frese). In this way, the “real time” recognition of counterfactual thoughts and
taking a conscious decision to follow up on them as a strategy for pursuing an opportunity
can be seen as a metacognitive process.
Previous research has indicated that metacognition can be taught (Haynie & Shep-
herd, 2009), and that the self-awareness associated with improved metacognition can help
reduce dependence on habitual, patterned behavior and biases in decision making (Sadler-
Smith & Shefy, 2007). If prospective entrepreneurs can be taught to recognize counter-
factual thoughts and their individual, habitual reactions to them, those with higher positive
affect and higher self-esteem—who our results show should benefit from these thoughts—
may be able to more effectively harness the benefit of looking back. Similarly, for those
lower in positive affect or self-esteem, an improved ability to recognize both counterfac-
tuals and habitual reactions to them, may allow them to choose a response strategy based
on some other decision process (Haynie & Shepherd). This may minimize the negative
effect that the counterfactual thought has: benefitting the entrepreneurial process.
Limitations
This research shares limitations with prior work focused on deconstructing the psy-
chological and cognitive processes associated with entrepreneurial behaviors and out-
comes. First, a limitation of this research is the use of primarily self-report measures.
Future research might combine self-reports with additional measures of entrepreneurial
self-efficacy based on, for example, “other-reports” (from peers, colleagues, etc.). Further,
like Zhao et al. (2005), we acknowledge that the use of a behavioral intention measure as
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a proxy for subsequent action represents a limitation of this study. Finally, by its very
nature, the study of counterfactual thinking opens the door to issues related to retrospec-
tive bias. This bias may be particularly evident given that our sample represents active
entrepreneurs, and prior research suggests that retrospective reconstructions of past events
“are particularly likely to be biased when intervening events have modified the meaning
of the initial event” (Donovan & Marlatt, 2005). This said, we suggest that such limita-
tions are part and parcel of the challenge of investigating constructs that reside at the
interface of cognition and personality. In addition, it is highly likely that additional
attributes of the individual (beyond affect, self-esteem, and the control variables incorpo-
rated in our analysis) may also moderate the relationship between counterfactual thinking
and entrepreneurial self-efficacy. For example, and as noted above, there has been a
significant amount of work in entrepreneurship focused on how an individual’s locus of
control may influence how an entrepreneur interprets entrepreneurial outcomes and
actions (Begley & Boyd, 1987; Lumpkin & Dess, 1986; Poon et al., 2006; Sebora, Lee, &
Sukasame, 2009). We highlight our inability to control for such possibilities as a limitation
of this research.
Finally, our sample also had in common an association with business incubators,
and we cite this self-selection bias as a possible limitation of this research. Arguably,
this association may suggest that entrepreneurs associated with incubators might differ
from the general population of entrepreneurs. For example, some of these differences
might include access to the incubators’ resources (both physical space and mentorship
services), support structures, and clear entrepreneurial intention. Some of these factors
may influence the nature and frequency of regrets differently, as compared to entrepre-
neurs who did not have an association with an incubator. Future research might explore
how the nature and frequency of counterfactuals for entrepreneurs associated with incu-
bators might differ in comparison to those entrepreneurs who did not have an associa-
tion with an incubator.
Conclusion
In the end, we believe that this research represents an important and meaningful step
toward clarifying the role that counterfactual thinking plays in the entrepreneurial process.
We empirically validate Baron’s (2008) contention that the interface between cognitions
and personal attributes such as affect is ongoing and “pervasive.” Our findings highlight
that some individuals are better suited to apply past experiences through counterfactual
thoughts toward developing strategies for future for “entrepreneuring” in a way that
illustrates prescriptions for advancing both the pedagogy and practice of entrepreneurship.
Appendix 1
Examples of Counterfactuals Reported by Study Respondents*
1. Invention–I should have considered the licensing path instead of the “do it all, earn it
all” approach.
2. I sincerely thought I, (repeat “I”) could achieve everything all by myself.
3. I regret not taking up offer of friend who wants to invest in the business.
4. I regret not getting investors involved.
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5. I regret relying too much on a single opportunity.
6. I should have handled potential stakeholders better.
7. I regret biting off more than I could chew, just because I wanted to be my own boss.
8. I regret exploring too many opportunities at the same time.
9. I failed to launch the idea due to a personal setback. Now I get a bit emotional when
I see so many players in my space.
10. I regret that I missed a big business opportunity because of a small error by the
employee.
11. I regret I didn’t go for mentorship initially, because I would be further along today.
12. I dragged a larger team down in a competitive proposal, because of my lack of
experience.
13. I should have done better to identify the correct partners/coworkers.
14. The execution strategy should had been more strong for the Portal Idea.
*This list is not all inclusive, but represents a sample of the regrets cited by study
participants.
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